

15 January 1987

NOTE FOR: DDA

FROM:

STAT

SUBJECT: OMS Critique of the Human Resources Task Force Report

The following are my comments as you requested.

A very good report as counterpoint to the HRTF. Should be must reading for the small number of senior managers who must make decisions on the HRTF report.

Emotional, a bit exaggerated, with underlying turf concerns--yes. But many comments criticizing methodology, citing research in the field, and pointing out hyperbole are right on.

There is a middle ground. The OMSers would have you analyze and study the situation to death and would play down the role of intuition about our culture. It was apparent to me, however, that the HRTF from the very first day was going to go too far in the opposite direction. This was partly because Ed was sending strong signals that he had already decided what the final report was going to say. This was tempered a bit by the strong personalities of the task force members, but it is not clear what was gained or lost in the end.

In fairness to the HRTF, the naivete, misinformation, and inadequate research that OMS cites is partly the result of inadequate documentation. The task force did, for example, attempt to structure interviews; they did do some research in the literature and look at private sector initiatives; and they did look into what is currently happening in the Agency. They did not describe any of this in the report and, as OMS quite accurately recognized, the members were amateurs in this field. There is no way they could reach the theoretical or resources base the professionals have.

If I was in charge, I wouldn't take either document without a lot of grains of salt and wouldn't move on the basis of either one alone. Taken together and mixed with some solid input from the ADCI/EXCOM level, they represent a framework to develop some sensible and doable initiatives.

Additional points on specific paragraphs will follow. *attached*

STAT

EA/DCI

SPECIFIC COMMENTS ON OMS CRITIQUE

- p.2 "making the organization look more like private industry" wasn't a Task Force goal. We wanted to be able to compete in the marketplace for applicants and to retain people, but we didn't want to "look like" anyone else because we are unique.
- Observation: This is one reason I have problems with the extent of the very manpower intensive research going on to find out everything going on in private industry and in the literature. After you get a general perspective of what works and what doesn't, and a few ideas to start your juices going, enough! Start building what makes sense for CIA.
- pp.4-5 The job analysis procedure and outcomes are similar to the development of the IMS Career Development Plan which stood the test of time. The Secretarial Career System could have benefited from more work in this area, both for current issues (conversion and first cycle reviews) and more importantly, to make the job enrichment goal more realistic.
- pp.6-7 The QWL suggestions made by the task force, including the section compiling ideas they collected from employees, are akin to the 32 inches the DCI received two years ago -- a brainstorm of ideas to be sorted and evaluated. In this light, none are silly or irresponsible.
- p.7 I would argue that if the environment in which our culture must operate changes (e.g. increasing terrorism), compensation may help retention and productivity.
- p.7 Paragraph 2 on compensation: who said across the board? Don't we believe some occs. may go up in value and some down?
- p.8 The Task Force did a poor job on what we wanted to achieve by more communication. It was just a blitz approach. I was all alone in the DO approach to compartmentation and need-to-know. I vote strongly against an Agency-wide newsletter.
- p.10 Re survey feedback: The Texas Instruments approach we used after the first IMS survey is similar to this, is time consuming, and it works.
- Observation: I have yet to see the survey which is about to be sent out. I have not been encouraged by what I have heard about the purpose, the questions themselves, the follow-up, and the plans for subsequent surveys. I hope someone smart is sitting astride this entire effort.

- p.12 If, despite individual studies, there is no empirical evidence, does that mean we don't take an intelligent risk because we don't want to be the trailblazers who create the first empirical evidence? (In fairness, OMS doesn't say we shouldn't try, but this relates to the question of how much study and analysis we do before we take any action.)
- p.13 I can say unequivocally that the DO does not meet Henneman's conditions of readiness. I doubt that the DO is alone.
- p.13 I think OMS is absolutely right on the reorganization, but I read between the lines ~~tht~~th they are right for the wrong reasons (turf concerns). ^
- pp.14-27 I tend to agree with [] that they thrashed around in the details and missed the main plot. Nevertheless, anyone who was too close to, or is too enamored with the HRTF report should read these pages. STAT
- p.27-34 Elements of Failed Programs: There is some meat here to consider to save us from unnecessary mistakes in implementation.
- pp.34-41 How to Succeed: Also meat to be considered by implementers. In this section and the previous one, the theories are only a small slice of what's available in the literature, but it gives the "amateurs" something to think about if they're in the decisionmaking chain of the HRTF report.
- p.36C I heartily agree with the first paragraph on competitive ranking. However, this might well turn out to be the biggest philosophical hurdle for at least one directorate, if true pay for performance is to be implemented.